test: fix multiple expectedWarnings bug
Commit 8fb4ea9 ("test: add deprecation code to expectWarning") did not take into account that the same warning could be expected multiple times. This bug was discovered in nodejs#18138 and this commit adds a fix for this issue. Refs: nodejs#18138

Commit 8fb4ea9 ("test: add deprecation code to expectWarning") did not take into account that the same warning could be expected multiple times. This bug was discovered in nodejs#18138 and this commit adds a fix for this issue. Refs: nodejs#18138
nodejs · tniessen · tniessen · tniessen · Jan 14, 2018 · tniessen
diff --git a/lib/internal/crypto/cipher.js b/lib/internal/crypto/cipher.js
+  let plaintextLength = -1;
+  if (options && options.plaintextLength != null) {
+    plaintextLength = options.plaintextLength;
+    if (~~plaintextLength !== plaintextLength || plaintextLength < 0)
diff --git a/doc/api/crypto.md b/doc/api/crypto.md
+- When decrypting, the authentication tag must be set via `setAuthTag()` before
+  specifying additional authenticated data and / or calling `update()`.
+  Otherwise, the behavior of the cipher is currently undefined and might result
+  in an error being thrown. Note that decryption without setting the correct
diff --git a/doc/api/crypto.md b/doc/api/crypto.md
+```js
+const crypto = require('crypto');
+
+const key = Buffer.from('266defe0911630ffac0e3633514e70d7', 'hex');
diff --git a/doc/api/crypto.md b/doc/api/crypto.md
+});
+const plaintext = Buffer.from('Hello world', 'utf8');
+cipher.setAAD(aad, {
+  plaintextLength: plaintext.length
diff --git a/lib/internal/crypto/cipher.js b/lib/internal/crypto/cipher.js
+function getAuthTagLength(options) {
+  let authTagLength;
+  if (options && (authTagLength = options.authTagLength) != null) {
+    authTagLength = options.authTagLength;
diff --git a/lib/internal/crypto/cipher.js b/lib/internal/crypto/cipher.js
+    if (plaintextLength >>> 0 !== plaintextLength)
+      throw new errors.TypeError('ERR_INVALID_OPT_VALUE', 'plaintextLength',
+                                 plaintextLength);
+  }
diff --git a/src/node_crypto.cc b/src/node_crypto.cc
-  if (!cipher->SetAAD(Buffer::Data(args[0]), Buffer::Length(args[0])))
+  CHECK_EQ(args.Length(), 2);
+  CHECK(args[1]->IsInt32());
+  int pt_len = args[1]->Int32Value();
diff --git a/src/node_crypto.cc b/src/node_crypto.cc
-             "Permitting authentication tag lengths of %u bytes is deprecated. "
-             "Valid GCM tag lengths are 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16.", tag_len);
-    ProcessEmitDeprecationWarning(cipher->env(), msg, "DEP0090");
+  int mode = EVP_CIPHER_mode(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(cipher->ctx_));
diff --git a/src/node_crypto.cc b/src/node_crypto.cc
+  int mode = EVP_CIPHER_mode(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx_));
+  if (!r && kind_ == kDecipher && mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
+    pending_auth_failed_ = true;
+    return 1;
diff --git a/src/node_crypto.cc b/src/node_crypto.cc
+    pending_auth_failed_ = true;
+    return 1;
+  }
+  return r;
diff --git a/src/node_crypto.cc b/src/node_crypto.cc
+
+  // In CCM mode, final() only checks whether authentication failed in update().
+  // EVP_CipherFinal_ex must not be called and will fail.
+  int r = mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE ? !pending_auth_failed_ :
diff --git a/src/node_crypto.cc b/src/node_crypto.cc
+                "OpenSSL constants differ between GCM and CCM");
+  if (IsAuthenticatedMode() &&
+      !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx_, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, iv_len, nullptr)) {
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx_);
diff --git a/src/node_crypto.cc b/src/node_crypto.cc
-                        len)) {
-    return false;
+  const EVP_CIPHER* const cipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx_);
+  int mode = EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher);